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MANIFESTO OF DEMOCRATIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Joshua Kleinfeld 
ABSTRACT—It is widely recognized that the American criminal system is 
in a state of crisis, but views about what has gone wrong and how it could 
be set right can seem chaotically divergent. This Essay argues that, within 
the welter of diverse views, one foundational, enormously important, and 
yet largely unrecognized line of disagreement can be seen. On one side are 
those who think the root of the present crisis is the outsized influence of a 
vengeful, poorly informed, or otherwise wrongheaded American public and 
the primary solution is to place control over the criminal system in the 
hands of officials and experts. On the other side are those who think the 
root of the crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives 
divorced from the American public’s concerns and sense of justice and the 
primary solution is to make criminal justice more community focused and 
responsive to lay influences. The former view reflects a norm of 
bureaucratic professionalization; the latter view reflects a norm of 
democratization. This Essay defines the two camps, specifies the concepts 
of bureaucracy and democracy underlying each one, and identifies some of 
the unifying ideas on the democratization side. This Essay thus attempts to 
bring conceptual order to the present cacophony of voices on criminal 
justice reform by specifying the conflict of visions at their center. As the 
opening piece of this Symposium Issue of the Northwestern University Law 
Review—a symposium not just about democratizing criminal justice but in 
defense of democratizing criminal justice—this Essay also paves the way 
for what will follow: a full-throated defense of the democratic criminal 
justice vision. 
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law and (by courtesy) Philosophy, 
Northwestern University. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
TWO VISIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In the first words of his last work, Bill Stuntz wrote: “Among the great 
untold stories of our time is this one: the last half of the twentieth century 
saw America’s criminal justice system unravel.”1 An unraveling suggests 
that things once were different—better—and in many ways they were. 
Enlightenment political theorists from Hobbes to Locke, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, Beccaria, and Tocqueville all predicted that democracy would 
bring reason and reasonableness, respect for individual rights, and 
compassion to criminal justice,2 and the United States from the Founding 
through the Early Republic through the mid-twentieth century substantially 
confirmed their prediction. The Bill of Rights is largely about crime and 
punishment: three of the ten Amendments that the Anti-Federalists 
demanded as a condition of constituting a national democratic government 
are about criminal procedure (the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth); another is about 
punishment (the Eighth); and one more—the First—is substantially, albeit 
implicitly, about the limits of criminalization. Popular movements for 
criminal justice reform, which the reformers themselves understood as 
pulling criminal justice out of a “monarchical” and into a “republican” era,3 
1 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2011). 
2 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 935–36 (2016). 
3 Witness, for example, Benjamin Rush, perhaps the leading anti-death penalty activist of the 
Founding period: 
[C]apital punishments are the natural offspring of monarchical governments. Kings believe that
they possess their crowns by a divine right: no wonder, therefore, they assume the divine power
of taking away human life . . . . But the principles of republican governments speak a very 
different language . . . . They appreciate human life, and increase public and private obligations 
to preserve it. They consider human sacrifices as no less offensive to the sovereignty of the 
people, than they are to the majesty of heaven. They view the attributes of government, like the 
attributes of the deity, as infinitely more honoured by destroying evil by means of merciful than 
by exterminating punishments. The united states have adopted these peaceful and benevolent 
forms of government. It becomes them therefore to adopt their mild and benevolent principles. 
An execution in a republic is like a human sacrifice in religion. It is an offering to 
monarchy . . . . 
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swept through the young country from the Founding through the mid-
nineteenth century, substantially eliminating punishments of the body 
(corporal punishment and maiming); aiming to abolish and succeeding in 
limiting capital punishment (abolition was a major issue just after the 
Founding); experimenting with rehabilitative prisons; and codifying 
substantive criminal law so as to reduce pockets of harshness and 
arbitrariness and transfer control from the judiciary to the more popularly 
accountable legislature.4 This penal moderation continued for most of the 
twentieth century: from the late 1920s through the early 1970s, America’s 
incarceration rate was fairly low, fairly stable, and roughly equal to what it 
is in Western European countries today.5 The history is by no means simple 
or uniformly bright. America is a big, complicated country: some 
communities and jurisdictions favored severity and rejected reform.6 Most 
or all excluded some groups—above all, black Americans—from the circle 
of those regarded as citizens in a moral sense, and the decencies that held 
within the circle of moral citizenship did not hold outside it.7 But within the 
circle of moral equality, and in terms of long historical timelines, American 
criminal law tended toward a reasonable compassion from the 1770s to the 
1970s. Furthermore, as Europe democratized, it too reformed criminal 
justice in the direction of greater mildness.8 The early theorists were not 
wrong: democracies are vigorous in their own defense and can be 
temperamental, but they are not steadily cruel. 
And then came the unraveling. It is a complex unraveling—complex 
enough that it is difficult to disentangle which among the dysfunctions are 
central and which peripheral, which cause and which effect. The present 
crisis in criminal justice may well have begun with the astonishing increase 
in crime itself—a “hurricane of crime”9 as one leading historian has termed 
it—that began in the 1960s, shortly before the increase in punitiveness in 
the 1970s.10 But if that hurricane of crime spurred or helped spur the 
criminal system’s transformation, the transformation has proved so extreme 
as to become calamitous in its own right. 
BENJAMIN RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF PUNISHING MURDER BY 
DEATH 18–19 (Philadelphia, Mathew Carey Press 1792). 
4 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 935, 987–88.  
5 Id. at 937. 
6 Id. at 936 n.11. 
7 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 83–106 (1993). 
8 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 936–37; see also James Q. Whitman, The Case for 
Penal Modernism: Beyond Utility and Desert, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 143, 143–44, 165, 168 (2014). 
9 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at x. 
10 See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 1021–27. 
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The catalogue of dysfunction starts with mass incarceration, prison 
conditions, policing, and—the site at which those three lines intersect—
racial justice. Mid-twentieth-century America imprisoned about one adult 
per thousand people, a rate that appears to be roughly typical throughout 
the economically advanced, contemporary Western world, including 
Western Europe today.11 In the 1970s, America’s imprisonment rate started 
rising, rising, rising, until, as of 2007, 1 out of every 132 people was 
imprisoned12 and 1 out of every 31 adults was under some form of 
correctional control (in prison, on probation, or on parole).13 Within those 
prisons and other correctional facilities, conditions today are often 
uselessly, counterproductively cruel—at once brutal in ways that have 
nothing to do with a crime’s prescribed sentence and criminogenic in ways 
that contribute to the very crime problem that imprisonment is meant to 
ameliorate.14 Turning from the prison to the street, from the hidden side of 
criminal justice to its most visible face (the face of the state itself for many 
Americans), the police have become one of the most controversial facets of 
American life today: an institution that at its best is a place of service and 
even heroism morphs too often into a form of state-sponsored violence and 
discrimination, experienced within some communities as an alien and 
oppressive force.15 Finally, running through all three issues is the red thread 
of race. The number of black and Hispanic Americans harassed by or in 
11 Id. at 939. Note, however, that the “one adult per thousand people” number on the American side 
excludes the local jail population, as well as juveniles held in juvenile facilities; it therefore probably 
understates the real rate of American imprisonment insofar as we are interested in imprisonment of all 
kinds. MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF LEE ANNE PARSONS, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1850–1984, at 35 tbl.3-7 & n.a (1986), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcsus5084.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3EA-424Q]. 
12 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 938. High as this number is, it probably understates the 
true rate of American imprisonment, at least if one is interested in imprisonment of all kinds. The claim 
is based on the number of people “held in public and private adult correctional facilities and in local 
jails” per 100,000 “U.S. residents”—so the numerator excludes juveniles held in juvenile facilities 
(though it includes juveniles held in adult facilities), while the denominator includes both adults and 
juveniles. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 6 tbl.8 & nn.a & e (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66FE-GW44]. 
13 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 938. This number is based on the “U.S. adult resident 
population on correctional supervision” out of the “U.S. adult resident population” in total. LAUREN E. 
GLAZE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION 
AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 tbl.1 (2009), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CLC-GJYM]. 
14 See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 996–1003. 
15 Stuntz makes a related point: “[R]esidents of the communities where mass incaraceration hits 
hardest, or at least many of them, are bound to see the justice system as an alien force that does not have 
those communites’ best interests at heart.” STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 286. 
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fear of police or incarcerated is not only extremely disproportionate relative 
to other racial and ethnic groups but so large in absolute terms as to make 
the fist of the criminal justice system part of ordinary life in many black 
and Hispanic neighborhoods.16 The result is that the criminal system has 
become one of the significant obstacles to democratic solidarity in 
American life today. As I have written elsewhere: “There is tragedy and 
irony in this. Crime is supposed to be antisocial; punishment should be 
prosocial. But American punishment has morphed into its own enemy: it 
has become antisocial itself.”17 In the present crisis, not just crime but both 
crime and the mechanisms by which we respond to crime mutually assail 
the common citizenship—the sense of fellow feeling, the practical 
conditions of equality, and the shared norms—on which democratic life 
depends.18 
Mass incarceration, prison conditions, policing, and racial justice are 
the most familiar problems, but there are more technical, legalistic forms of 
dysfunction that are also significant and probably contribute causally to the 
big four. One is the law governing American punishment, which gives rise 
to far more severe sentences than in any other economically advanced, 
democratic nation today and far more severe than was true of American 
punishment itself for most of this country’s own history.19 The issue of 
sentencing severity concerns not just decades-long terms of imprisonment 
for major crimes but also a good deal of mid- and low-level carceral churn, 
which appears to contribute significantly to mass incarceration.20 Severity 
also surfaces in the rigidity of a sentencing system that seems unwilling to 
allow equitable judgment a role, or at least to deny that form of moral 
discretion to anyone but prosecutors.21 And it surfaces in grading decisions, 
as legislatures routinely—it seems almost reflexively—use felonies where 
16 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1485, 1494–95 (2016); see also STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 1; ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L.
SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1980–2008, at 3 & tbl.1, 11 & figs.17 & 18, 13 & figs.19, 20a & 20b (2011),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7RV-VSRG]; E. ANN CARSON &
WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 7
tbl.7, 8 tbl.8, 9 tbl.9, 26 app. tbls.6 & 7, 27 app. tbls.8 & 9, 28 app. tbls.10 & 11 (2012),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6EH-NB9D]; BRIAN A. REAVES,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES
3 tbls.4 & 5 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV4M-CMW5]. 
17 Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 1036. 
18 See Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 16, at 1493–94, 1562–64. 
19 See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 936–38, 1020–32. 
20 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 72–77 (2017). 
21 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 6–8 (1998). 
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misdemeanors would do, misdemeanors where violations would do, and 
imprisonment where noncarceral options would do. 
Overcriminalization is another concern, and one that is, in my view, 
often misunderstood. The term brings to mind debates about drugs or 
perhaps crimes of vice generally, but if we understand criminalization more 
conceptually—as whatever form of law operates to expand the set of 
conduct that counts as criminal—then a much broader array of legal 
developments comes into view. If the departments of the law were 
countries on a map, criminal law would be an expansionist power, pushing 
into its neighbors. Consider, as a nonexhaustive list: the use of criminal law 
as the backstop of the regulatory state and, relatedly, criminal law’s 
intrusion into areas once governed civilly or otherwise noncriminally (like 
the corporate sphere); the elimination or technification of mens rea 
standards in ways that delink criminal guilt and actual culpability, thus 
sweeping a larger and more ambiguously wrongful set of actions into 
criminal law’s net (and making guilt easier to prove); the broadening of 
liability rules such that more and more people tangentially connected to 
crime are guilty of something; the narrowing of defenses such that fewer 
and fewer people with claims of excuse or justification (including, 
particularly, the mentally ill) can escape being guilty of something; the 
expansion of federal criminal law such that, rather than different sovereigns 
in different settings, many acts are criminal on multiple levels and thus 
subject to a layer cake of prosecutors, each with an option on enforcement; 
the sheer proliferation of offenses in penal codes, many inchoate in subtle 
ways (like possession crimes) or overlapping such that a single course of 
conduct can be charged in multiple ways (often at the same time); and the 
use of strategic and often pretextual crime definitions, which, in making 
serious offenders easier to prosecute, had the side effect of making 
criminals of us all. At the root of all this is a view of the criminal law as a 
general instrument of social control coupled with the state’s limitless 
appetite for social control. Criminal law will tend to expand when its 
governing principle is expediency; the civil/criminal distinction is 
inconvenient for the project of power. Yet the effect is to rob criminal law 
of its moral authority and to produce an enforcement system so filled with 
law as to become, paradoxically, almost lawless—for limitless 
criminalization makes enforcement limitlessly discretionary.22 
Another set of important but legally technical dysfunctions concern 
procedure and institutional design. The Warren Court’s procedural 
22 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 592 
(2001) (“[M]ore law has produced a fundamentally lawless system . . . .”). 
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revolution has been substantially diminished, hollowed out by a string of 
anti-Warren Courts and a long series of not particularly dramatic cases that 
collectively amount to a counterrevolution.23 Indeed, it seems to me that the 
Warren Court’s procedural revolution can now be seen in historical 
perspective as the last gasp of the mid-twentieth century’s experiments in 
penal mildness. Of even greater consequence—of the greatest 
consequence—the trial has died: more than 95% of felony cases are now 
resolved by guilty plea, typically as the result of plea bargains.24 With that 
procedural development has come an institutional one: the massive increase 
in prosecutors’ power relative to other actors in the criminal justice system. 
It was once the case that the grand jury supervised the charging function; 
judges, juries, and the press in open courtrooms supervised the finding of 
guilt; substantive law created by legislators and judges set a high standard 
for what constitutes guilt (which also, by making guilt hard to prove, 
enhanced the role of judges, juries, and defense counsel at trial); and judges 
controlled sentencing. Plea bargaining and related legal developments have 
removed these checks and balances, ordinarily characteristic of America’s 
very approach to governance, and created a shadow system of criminal 
procedure whose core characteristic is that prosecutors are substantially 
unconstrained. Substantive criminal law paves the ways by giving 
prosecutors the tools by which to extract confessions—widely divergent 
charges for a given course of conduct, widely divergent sentences for a 
given charge, and offense definitions that are easy to prove. (In a sense, 
well-constructed substantive criminal law is part of the system of checks 
and balances.) Procedural law cooperates by not imposing vigorous 
oversight on the bargains. And in a flash, virtually the whole apparatus 
assumed in the Constitution—the apparatus of trial, jury, judge, and 
press—disappears. The democratic public disappears. In a sense, 
adjudication disappears. In its place is just an unmarked door, opening to a 
windowless room, two lawyers within, striking a deal. 
Finally, a reasonable assessment of any criminal system must of 
course include how well that system functions to control crime. The 
evidence on that score for American criminal justice is uncertain. America 
has a high crime rate relative to most advanced nations and, in some 
neighborhoods, daily life is statistically as dangerous as life in a failed 
state25—and has the look and feel of life in a failed state. On the other hand, 
23 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?: Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2466–71 (1996). 
24 STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 7. 
25 See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 1020–26. For example, the upscale Chicago 
neighborhood of Hyde Park, where the University of Chicago sits, has a homicide rate of 3 per 100,000 
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America’s crime rate has declined significantly since the hurricane of crime 
that arguably brought the era of penal severity about, and the decline 
correlates with the severity.26 What role the criminal justice system played 
in the decline is difficult to know: crime rates can be high or low and can 
rise or fall for many reasons, and isolating the causal effect of the criminal 
justice system with confidence is simply beyond the present reach of 
human knowledge. My own, admittedly debatable view is that American 
criminal law’s severity has succeeded in taking a significant number of 
highly dangerous people off the street. But if the criminal system’s severity 
has provided some benefits, it has done so in a way that also exacts 
enormous social costs, and if it has contributed to making parts of the 
country safer, it has utterly failed to provide a reasonable measure of safety 
in poor urban neighborhoods and poor rural areas.27 If the “we” of “We the 
People” is a truly democratic “we” that includes us all, then this much is 
true: despite our penal severity, we are not safe. 
This catalogue of dysfunction, which is not exhaustive, has made 
America’s criminal system the focal point of profound social conflict, 
particularly with regard to issues of race. The crisis of criminal justice is 
one of the great policy issues of our time. To use a term like crisis can 
sound like alarmism, or the rhetorical excess of academics who think their 
field is the center of the world, or political advocacy from the left. Yet 
some of us gathered together for this Symposium on democratizing 
criminal justice, as well as the larger group that gathered together for the 
conference from which this Symposium comes, are liberal, some 
conservative; some of us are academics, others are judges, legal 
practitioners, or policymakers; and the present crisis has come to be 
acknowledged by leaders within both parties, the federal and state 
judiciaries, Congress and many state legislatures, many governors, the last 
(based on a 2011 source); the adjacent neighborhood of Washington Park, which is poor and 98% 
black, has a homicide rate of 78 per 100,000. STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 21. The Chicago neighborhood 
of Austin (at roughly 100,000 people, the largest neighborhood in Chicago) had a 2015 homicide rate of 
48 per 100,000, which spiked in 2016 to 87 per 100,000, while the Chicago neighborhood of Lakeview 
(also roughly 100,000 people and the second largest neighborhood in Chicago) had in both years a 
homicide rate of 1 per 100,000. UNIV. OF CHI. CRIME LAB, GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO, 2016, at 31 
(2017), http://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca19f4f225b810ce0dbdb9231c
bdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Violence+in+Chicago+2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G3JP-AB25]. By way of context, the homicide rate in wealthy European nations toward the 
end of the twentieth century was 1 per 100,000; in the United States as a whole was 7 per 100,000; and 
in sub-Saharan Africa was 22 per 100,000. RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 7 fig.1.4 (2009). 
With the highest homicide rate in the world (for which there is data), Honduras in 2014 was at 75 per 
100,000. Intentional Homicides (Per 100,000 People), WORLD BANK (2017), http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 [https://perma.cc/2YMA-C4S7]. 
26 See Kleinfeld, Two Cultures, supra note 2, at 1020–26; see also PFAFF, supra note 20, at 1–13. 
27 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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President, and almost every major candidate for the presidency in the last 
election (though not the winner, or at least, not in the same way as the 
others).28 Furthermore, the role of law in the criminal justice crisis is 
unusual. Every major policy challenge facing the country has legal 
elements, but criminal law and procedure are at issue in the criminal justice 
crisis not just because of what they regulate—because of crime—but 
because of the content and character of the law itself. Criminal justice as a 
body of law, practice, and policy is itself one of the great challenges facing 
America today. That is true of no other area of law. 
Yet if the existence of the crisis is now all but a matter of consensus, 
when it comes to understanding why the system has unraveled and how it 
could be set right—the fundamental problems of diagnosis and 
prescription, of understanding and action—the consensus evaporates and in 
its place is what can seem like a cacophony of conflicting voices. The 
disagreements reflect more than just the usual variety of views that attend 
any active field of scholarship and policy. They reflect unusually 
fundamental and passionate differences in outlook. This is not a situation in 
which well-meaning people mostly agree about what to do but can’t 
28 See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference [https://
perma.cc/8WRH-9PH9] (“[T]oday, I want to focus on one aspect of American life that remains 
particularly skewed by race and by wealth, a source of inequity that has ripple effects on families and 
on communities and ultimately on our nation — and that is our criminal justice system . . . . But here’s 
the good news . . . . [W]hen, let’s face it, it seems like Republicans and Democrats cannot agree on 
anything . . . a lot of them agree on this.”); see also Stephanie Clifford, From the Bench, a New Look at 
Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/nyregion/from-the-
bench-a-new-look-at-punishment.html [https://perma.cc/YUC3-WJTQ] (“[A]cross the country, some 
judges are refashioning sentences, asking prosecutors to drop cases that judges see as unfair, 
considering how to reduce the long-term impact of old convictions, and writing essays advocating 
change.”); Carl Hulse, Unlikely Cause Unites the Left and the Right: Justice Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/politics/unlikely-cause-unites-the-left-and-the-
right-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/UPS8-LUFX] (describing the view among many U.S. 
Senators that the “criminal justice system is broken” and their bipartisan efforts to reform it); Eric 
Tucker, Addiction, Drug Sentences and Policing Being Discussed by Candidates in 2016 Presidential 
Race, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/
articles/2015/11/25/criminal-justice-issues-showing-up-in-2016-presidential-race [https://perma.cc/
VDN5-GESH] (“[E]ven among those in both parties who support changing the criminal justice system, 
there’s no consensus on how to do it and candidates are scrambling to differentiate themselves on what 
law and order means.”); Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/
confidence-institutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/5AAZ-XZGJ] (reporting that, as of June 2016, only 23% 
of Americans describe their level of confidence in the criminal justice system as either a “great deal” or 
“quite a lot”). But see Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Creating a New and Better Future for America’s 
Inner Cities (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-remarks-
in-milwaukee-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/N7PE-A5VF] (“Tonight, I am going to talk about how to 
make our communities safe again from crime and lawlessness . . . . Law and order must be restored . . . . 
There is no compassion in tolerating lawless conduct. Crime and violence is an attack on the poor, and 
will never be accepted in a Trump Administration.”). 
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summon the political will to do it. The crisis of criminal justice is in part a 
crisis of ideas. 
The premise of this Symposium and the first contribution we hope it 
makes to the discourse on criminal justice is that the voices of diagnosis 
and reform are not a cacophony. Within the welter of diverse views about 
what has gone wrong and how it could be set right, one foundational, 
enormously important, and yet largely unrecognized line of disagreement 
can be seen. On one side are those who think the root of the present crisis is 
the outsized influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful, stupid, 
uninformed, racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded American 
public—and the solution is to place control over criminal justice in the 
hands of officials and experts. On the other side are those who think the 
root of the present crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and 
incentives divorced from the American public’s concerns and sense of 
justice, and the solution is to make criminal justice more community 
focused and responsive to lay influences. The first side flies the banners of 
professionalization, instrumental rationality, and bureaucratic control. The 
second side flies the banners of community, value rationality, and—the 
watchword of the movement—democracy. The two views, bureaucratic 
professionalization versus democratization, represent a conflict of visions. 
To some extent, of course, this dichotomy compresses the nuances of 
the views on both sides, as any such characterization would. An 
individual’s views might partake of both sides depending on the particular 
issue, or might fall in the middle, or the dichotomy itself might not apply. 
Empirically, American criminal justice exhibits a marbling of democratic 
and bureaucratic elements, and normative views about reform—about what 
a good system of criminal justice would look like—tend to exhibit some 
measure of marbling as well. Furthermore, democratization and 
bureaucratic professionalization must be read as big tent positions that 
house under their banners variations on their operative themes. Yet with 
those caveats in place, the dichotomy nonetheless has force. It sops up 
much of the variation in the field. It brings clarity and conceptual order to 
what might otherwise seem like a riot of claims and arguments; indeed, 
even if one rejects the dichotomy as a way of characterizing whole 
positions or schools of thought, one might still find it helpful for 
understanding and evaluating particular arguments or concerns. Above all, 
however, what recommends the dichotomy is that, in broad strokes, it fits. 
Among those deeply versed in criminal justice, there really is a deep 
division between those who basically see the democratic public as the 
problem and those who basically see it as the solution. For all the nuances 
in any particular person’s ideas—and it is possible to attend overmuch to 
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those nuances—one can typically see in those ideas a direction of thought. 
Arguments come with premises and implications, tonalities of thought and 
feeling, even a spirit, which run deeper than the arguments’ particulars, and 
which place the arguments within a larger family of ideas or point of 
view.29 These families are built collectively and it is they that really move 
the worlds of thought and action. In ideas about politics, it matters which 
way one thinks the arrow points. In criminal justice, very often, it points 
either toward more or less democratic control. 
There is also something to be gained from making common cause. 
That too is a premise of this Symposium and the conference on which it is 
based. Those of us assembled here are the democratizers, and we are 
writing together to identify and critically examine the foundational ideas 
that define the democratization perspective; to fit those ideas together into a 
whole, a point of view of our own; and to project those shared ideas out 
into the world with more force than we could alone. The genesis of this 
project is different from most academic conferences and symposia. It was 
not our goal merely to discuss the theme of democracy and criminal law, 
and the papers gathered here are neither one-off pieces on the subject nor 
just the latest steps in the various authors’ various research agendas. 
Rather, each author was asked to survey and sum up the democratic themes 
in his or her career of work as a whole—retrospectively interpreting past 
work rather than advancing an isolated thesis—and, in addition, to 
participate in collectively authoring a set of policy proposals for reforming 
criminal justice in a democratic direction. It bears emphasis that, because of 
this approach, the essays in this Symposium—including this Manifesto—
do not present all of the fine-grained evidence, argumentative nuance, and 
responses to objections necessary to fully defend the democratization 
program. That scholarly rigor is indispensably important, and it exists, but 
it is contained in the many past articles and books written by the various 
contributors to this Symposium. We could not possibly do justice to all of 
that prior scholarship, nor indeed to the force of the objections themselves, 
by trying to review it all in these short essays. It is not our project here to 
review it but to build on it, to draw it together. Our goal here is to 
collectively define what democratizing criminal justice means and 
thereby—hopefully—to launch a movement in the world of ideas and, 
perhaps, one day, politics as well. One can think of this Symposium as the 
proceedings of the founding meeting of the Comintern—but in a nice, pro-
democracy way. Whether we have succeeded is for readers to judge. 
29 What is the “spirit” of an argument? I attempt a nonmetaphorical definition in Reconstructivism: 
“[T]he spirit of a normative position is the unity of its reasons and the feelings that make those reasons 
seem compelling.” Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 16, at 1564. 
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I. THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF THE TWO VISIONS
We term our perspective the “democratic justice view” and the 
“democratization movement.” But in what sense do we use the term 
“democracy”? And what should we term the other of our view? 
“Democracy” is at once an intuitive and a profoundly contested 
concept. An astonishing variety of governments have claimed the title of 
“democracy,” including not just diverse forms of contemporary 
constitutional organization (parliamentary, presidential, national, federated, 
etc.) but also many authoritarian “people’s republics” and “democratic 
republics” as well. Some of these claims to democracy are hypocritical, of 
course, but others reflect sincere disagreement about what democracy 
means, and even the hypocrisies are interesting from the standpoint of 
intellectual history: claiming to represent “the people” seems to be a 
political imperative of the modern era, and so “democracy” becomes part 
of the justificatory rhetoric of wildly divergent forms of government. 
Turning from politics to theory, the array of different conceptions of 
democracy (majoritarian, pluralist, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian, etc.) is 
so diverse that one can lose all sense of a common core. To some extent, 
the cause of this conceptual chaos is, again, the felt need in the modern 
world to claim the mantle of democracy, and so the intellectuals, like the 
politicians, indulge in sleight of hand, self-deception, hypocrisy, or a sort of 
radical drift (sometimes conscious, sometimes not) in which they elaborate 
the concept of democracy in ways that preserve the term but for purposes 
no ordinarily socialized member of the culture could recognize as 
corresponding to its substance. The trick is to re-formulate what 
“democracy” means; enough intellectual dexterity and one can get license 
to claim (and even believe) oneself to be a democrat while espousing views 
that are in fairness anything but. Few people want to admit even to 
themselves that they are anti-democratic, though many are. Yet even if one 
recognizes these manipulations for what they are and sets them aside, there 
is still a large zone of reasonable and good faith disagreement about what 
“democracy” means. Much as the term might seem intuitively appropriate 
for the idea that criminal justice should be “more community focused and 
responsive to lay influences,” as those of us participating in this 
Symposium believe, our efforts might be hampered if we lack an articulate 
explanation of what we mean by “democracy.” 
I would thus like to propose a conception of democracy, not 
necessarily for all contexts, but for purposes of clarifying the shared vision 
underlying our movement to democratize criminal justice. The theoretical 
effort will take us from Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas to Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Philip Pettit, but I submit that the conception of 
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democracy thus developed is not obscure but just a way of spelling out 
analytically a familiar and widely shared set of ideas. 
Max Weber was above all a theorist of modernity, and among his 
transformative ideas was that bureaucratization is modernity’s defining 
feature.30 The term “bureaucracy” did not carry for him the pejorative 
implications it carries in contemporary American politics. He meant it in its 
etymological sense: “bureau” meaning “office” and “kratos” meaning 
“rule”—thus rule by officeholders, government through officials. He 
described the bureaucratic form of life in exquisite and startlingly prescient 
detail, but in his account one can distill, I submit, three core features of all 
bureaucracy as such. The first is the displacement of the laity by an 
officialdom, or to be more precise, governance and administration, not by 
the lay people in their capacity as citizens or as ad hoc officials, nor by 
charismatic leadership, but by a professionalized corps of officials and 
experts.31 The second is government through technical expertise, 
knowledge, and general rules applied to particular cases, as opposed to 
prudential judgment, equitable discretion, individualized moral evaluation, 
intuition, or common sense.32 The third, which turns on Weber’s insight 
that to adopt a form of government is to adopt a form of thought, is the 
pervasive use of and preference for instrumental rationality—a term Weber 
coined.33 That is, bureaucratic government operates with a distinct 
conception of what it means to be rational, a conception Weber thought 
characteristic of modernity itself, according to which one identifies an end 
to be maximized and uses the technical apparatus of government to secure 
that end as efficiently as possible. The other of instrumental rationality is 
not irrationality but what Weber termed value rationality, in which 
decisions are taken by consciously considering which course of action best 
coheres with one’s own or the community’s ethos, norms, or values, 
typically through attention to concrete particulars or a concrete balancing 
of interests.34 To act in a certain way because one thinks so acting is, for 
30 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217, 975, 1002–03, 1393–95 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds. & trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). 
31 See id. at 217–26, 267, 290, 758–63, 956–58, 973–75. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. at 24–26, 891. 
34 Id. In certain passages, Weber does slip into referring to equitable, particularistic decisionmaking 
as “irrational,” rather than “value rational,” but both the overall context and the tenor of those passages 
does not suggest that he regarded them as instances of nonthinking or poor thinking so much as thinking 
of a different kind. See, e.g., id. at 656–67. My view is that Weber found it convenient to adopt the 
language of modernity—a perspective for which “rationality” just means instrumental, general forms of 
reason—in order to make certain points about modernity, and since his focus was expressly descriptive 
rather than normative, he did not greatly concern himself with the negative implications of the term 
“irrational.” 
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example, “required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, 
personal loyalty, or the importance of some ‘cause’” is to act on value 
rational grounds.35 
Taken together, Weber envisioned modern government—and 
incidentally, modern business as well—as structured such that power is 
exercised by officeholders with subject matter expertise employing 
technical knowledge to accomplish some given set of ends in 
instrumentally rational ways. For many of us today, it might be difficult to 
imagine any other way of ordering the world—encountering Weber’s ideas 
is for me like seeing the social world as I’ve known it laid out in conceptual 
form, something I don’t so much choose to believe as find, in Holmes’s 
phrase, “that I can’t help believing”36—but Weber had the historical and 
comparative knowledge to know that there are other ways of ordering the 
world, and he lived closer to the cusp of the change than we do. Notably, 
Weber was neither wholly for nor against the brave new world of 
bureaucratic modernity. He thought much would be gained by it but also 
certain things of value—certain ways of relating spiritually to the world, 
for example—irretrievably lost, and his writing about bureaucratization is 
tinged with the sadness of the loss.37 Mostly he thought the transformation 
inevitable.38 Also important for present purposes, Weber argued that law 
and lawyers have a tendency toward bureaucratic organization, in part 
because he thought bureaucratic legitimacy bottoms out in “legal 
35 Id. at 25. The types of rationality can and often do mix: 
Choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined in a value-
rational manner. In that case, action is instrumentally rational only in respect to the choice of 
means. On the other hand, the actor may, instead of deciding between alternative and conflicting 
ends in terms of a rational orientation to a system of values, simply take them as given 
subjective wants and arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency. 
Id. at 26. 
36 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 
107 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (“[W]hen I say that a thing is true I only mean that I can’t help 
believing it . . . .”); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918) (“If, 
as I have suggested elsewhere, the truth may be defined as the system of my (intellectual) limitations, 
what gives it objectivity is the fact that I find my fellow man to a greater or less extent (never wholly) 
subject to the same Can’t Helps.”). 
37 See, e.g., MAX WEBER, SCIENCE AS A VOCATION (1918), reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (“The fate of our 
times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment 
of the world.’ Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into 
the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. 
It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental, nor is it accidental that today 
only within the smallest and intimate circles, in personal human situations, in pianissimo, that 
something is pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in former times swept through 
the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together.”). 
38 See id. 
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authority”39 and in part because he saw law’s tendency to order the world 
by general rules as characteristic of the formal orientation of bureaucratic 
governance.40  
Yet, in a variety of ways, Weber thought the Anglo-American, 
common law tradition resists that bureaucratic pull. He saw the jury trial as 
a form of resistance to bureaucracy—a grant of authority to the laity in the 
midst of a process otherwise dominated by legal professionals and a 
preservation of the laity’s characteristically particularistic, equitable, value 
rational mode of reasoning in the midst of law’s otherwise formal, rule-
based mode of administration.41 He also saw the common law tradition of 
developing norms in response to particular, individual situations as anti-
bureaucratic in character,42 and likewise the tendency to resolve cases on 
the basis of a “concrete balancing of interests” or “in terms of concrete 
ethical or other practical valuations” (which is related to both common law 
and realist styles of adjudication).43 Weber even remarked in this anti-
bureaucratic vein on the common law’s regard for “the very personal 
authority of an individual judge” and the view of the common law judge’s 
“opinion” (as we revealingly term it) as “the very personal creation of the 
concrete individual judge”—in contrast to the Continent’s view of judges 
as civil servants exercising a neutral form of technical expertise.44 These 
points will prove relevant later, as we attempt to specify what it is the 
movement to democratize criminal justice is for and against, but to 
anticipate the thought: the democratization movement’s goal in part is to 
join in Anglo-American law’s traditional resistance to the total 
bureaucratization of legal arrangements. We aim to preserve pockets of 
nonbureaucratic reason and authority within a system of criminal law that 
is inevitably bureaucratized to a substantial extent. We want a criminal 
system built of ill-fitting parts, a criminal system that both accommodates 
and frustrates official purposes, that interferes, that resists—a system that 
functions, not hierarchically, but agonistically. 
What does all this mean for the concept of democracy? As Weber saw 
vividly, bureaucratization’s modes of thought, modes of governance, and 
ambition to direct events tends to conflict with democracy’s often 
39 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 215 (arguing that legal authority “rest[s] on a 
belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to 
issue commands”). 
40 See id. at 653–58. 
41 See id. at 758–63, 813–14, 891–95. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 891, 976. 
44 Id. at 890. 
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antithetical modes of thought, modes of governance, and equal ambition to 
direct events: “If, however, an ‘ethos’—not to speak of other impulses—
takes hold of the masses on some individual question, its postulates of 
substantive justice, oriented toward some concrete instance and person, will 
unavoidably collide with the formalism and the rule-bound and cool 
‘matter-of-factness’ of bureaucratic administration.”45 The root problem is 
that a system of rule premised on the equality and sovereignty of the 
governed will seek to prevent “the development of a closed status group of 
officials” and to minimize “the authority of officialdom in the interest of 
expanding the sphere of influence of ‘public opinion.’”46 It will not wholly 
relieve the tension to put democratic forces formally in command: 
The power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under 
normal conditions overpowering. The political “master” always finds himself, 
vis-[á]-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the 
expert . . . . [even when] the “master,” whom the bureaucracy serves, is the 
“people” . . . or a parliament . . . or a popularly elected president . . . .47 
Above all, democratic forces will resent “the leveling of the governed in 
[the] face of the governing and bureaucratically articulated group, which in 
its turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and in form.”48 
Thus, Weber concluded, “‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the ‘rule’ of 
bureaucracy.”49 Others have echoed these ideas.50 It is interesting to 
encounter them at the present moment, amidst Brexit and the other tensions 
between Europe’s national democracies and the bureaucratically articulated 
European Union, and the perennial tensions in the United States between 
elected leadership and the administrative state. 
45 Id. at 980. Ironically, as Weber recognized, democracy also helps bring bureaucracy about: 
“Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy,” because (among other things) mass 
democracy opposes “the feudal, patrimonial, and—at least in intent—the plutocratic privileges” that 
come with the administration of government by local notables. Id. at 983–84. Thus “democracy 
inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which have been produced by its very 
fight against the notables.” Id. at 985. 
46 Id. at 985. 
47 Id. at 991–92. 
48 Id. at 985. 
49 Id. at 991. 
50 See, e.g., NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 37–38 (Richard Bellamy ed., Roger 
Griffin trans., Polity Press 1987) (1984) (“Technocracy and democracy are antithetical: if the expert 
plays a leading role in industrial society he cannot be considered as just any citizen. The hypothesis 
which underlies democracy is that all are in a position to make decisions about everything. The 
technocracy claims, on the contrary, that the only ones called on to make decisions are the few who 
have the relevant expertise . . . . [W]hereas in a democratic society power is transmitted from the base 
upwards, in a bureaucratic society power descends from the top.”). 
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We can draw on this democracy/bureaucracy opposition to clarify 
what we mean by “democracy” (and what our opponents mean by its 
absence) in the movement to democratize criminal justice. It comes to this: 
one dimension of democracy is its character as an anti-bureaucratic force 
or (more modestly) as a counterweight to bureaucratic forces. This means 
that democratizers in the criminal justice context reverse Weber’s three 
core features of all bureaucracy as such. That is, we think there is an 
important place in the criminal system for governance by lay people in 
their capacity as citizens; we want to maintain room in criminal law and 
procedure for prudential, equitable, and individualized moral judgment; 
and we think criminal justice is often better served by the exercise of value 
rationality than by instrumental rationality. We also favor (again, in the 
criminal justice context) Anglo-American law’s traditional “pockets of 
resistance” response to the bureaucratization of law. 
We turn now to two bodies of thought within more conventional 
democratic theory: the theoretical traditions of deliberative democracy and 
participatory democracy. Key to both traditions is that they do not consider 
it sufficient for democratic purposes that the people elect a set of 
representatives who rule them, let alone that the people elect a set of 
representatives who, together with appointed officials, constitute a 
governing class that rules them. Indeed, both traditions deny that 
relationships of representation are, by themselves, sufficient for democratic 
purposes. Deliberative and participatory democracy insist, as their names 
imply, on the importance of the broader political community’s deliberation 
on matters of public concern and participation in the activity of 
government, such that the law, policies, and practices of the state 
substantially reflect and result from the will, beliefs, and values of the 
people living within the state. Deliberative and participatory democracy 
thus envision a much larger role for “We the People” than is envisaged by 
the familiar conception of democracy as a regime wholly based on electing 
representatives. 
To get clear on the stakes here, it’s useful to contrast deliberative and 
participatory democracy with Joseph Schumpeter’s skeptical, minimalist 
alternative. For Schumpeter, there is no “will of the people” that could or 
should decide matters of policy or direct the actions of elected 
representatives, and whatever emerges from public deliberation would 
probably have disastrous effects if made the basis for policy.51 The 
electorate’s role is not “the deciding of issues” but “the election of the men 
51 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 252–53 (Routledge 2003) 
(1943). 
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who are to do the deciding.”52 The “men who are to do the deciding” are 
drawn “from those elements of the population that are available for the 
political vocation” and thus from a selective “social stratum”—a governing 
class, an elite.53 Inevitably, that elite exhibits internal disagreement, and 
thus there is “competition for political leadership”54 within that class. 
Democracy means only that the basis for winning that competition is 
getting more votes at regular elections. Put in terms of a definition: “the 
democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”55 Thus democracy consists 
essentially in choosing which set of elites rules at a given time. Neither 
deliberation nor participation matters, and although elections do, 
representation is not the reason: the winners do not stand in for, recapitulate 
the views and values of, or otherwise represent the electorate. The election 
procedure is purely an accountability mechanism, enabling the electorate to 
protect itself against incompetence or abuse. Thus government is (as even 
Schumpeter thinks it should be) for the people. But it is not by them, nor of 
them: “If results that prove in the long run satisfactory to the people at 
large are made the test of government for the people, then government by 
the people, as conceived by the classical doctrine of democracy, would 
often fail to meet it.”56 Having chosen a government, the people should get 
out of the way of its efficient stewardship. In particular, the professional 
bureaucracy must be able to do its work unimpeded.57 Thus democracy in 
even the minimal sense of majoritarian elections alone is not a good in 
itself (for what if a country “in a democratic way, practices the persecution 
of Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughtering of Jews”?), but a 
means or “method” by which to advance “ultimate ideals”—among them 
“justice”—and its value depends on its tendency to advance those ideals.58 
Like all the best worldly, demoralized realisms (there are quite a 
number, and they share a rhetorical structure), Schumpeter’s account has 
the arresting effect of seeming to lay bare a hard, stark truth. And like all 
the best worldly, demoralized realisms, his account is clearly partly true, 
which can make it seem wholly true. But notice what is lost: Schumpeter’s 
conception of democracy loses all sense of the ideal of a sovereign people 
52 Id. at 269. 
53 Id. at 290–91. 
54 Id. at 269. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 256. 
57 Id. at 293. 
58 Id. at 242. 
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governing itself. Deliberative and participatory democracy are complex 
traditions that involve diverse theorists and theories, but what gives them 
shape is precisely the effort to recover that ideal. 
Deliberative democracy focuses on the importance, in any political 
community that aspires to be truly democratic, of free and equal citizens 
within the community deliberating on matters of shared political concern, 
including questions of value.59 From that foundation, the tendrils of the 
tradition curl in different directions, some of which I think are mistaken or 
unhelpful, but at (what I see as) its best, the deliberative tradition advances 
three core claims: (1) that the public sphere of a democracy should be 
constituted in conditions of sufficient freedom and equality that all of the 
individuals comprising the political community are in a position to 
communicate about public life on fair terms, with access to the relevant 
means of communication and without fear of reprisal, manipulation 
through propaganda, or other forms of domination; (2) that citizens in a 
democracy should debate at least the most important political decisions in 
the public sphere, and the debate should be not just an airing of 
immoveable preferences but, at least aspirationally, a setting in which 
minds might change; and (3) that government, in establishing law and 
policy or taking action, should heed and should find itself compelled to 
heed the results of the public debate.60 These deliberative conditions are 
necessary to democracy because they serve an essential democratic end. 
The end is to ensure that the individuals who comprise society can 
participate in “democratic opinion- and will-formation,”61 and that 
government has to listen once the democratic opinion and will are formed. 
The fundamental idea is one of authorship: where the community makes 
the law out of its own convictions, the community can truly be seen as self-
governing; the people can rationally see themselves as the law’s author. As 
Habermas puts it: “The idea of self-legislation by citizens, that is, requires 
that those subject to law as its addressees can at the same time understand 
themselves as authors of law.”62 
59 See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (1996) (“We 
address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures 
a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political 
theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their 
representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable 
decisions.”). 
60 These general ideas, though not this framing, can be found in, for example, JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 107, 110, 127 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992); see also 
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3–7 (2004). 
61 HABERMAS, supra note 60, at 300. 
62 Id. at 120. 
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In other words, central to democracy on a deliberative view is a 
community’s capacity to freely develop its political culture and to project 
that culture into the realm of government. There is, it must be said, a 
portion of the deliberative tradition that takes these premises in an anti-
majoritarian, indeed, anti-popular sovereignty, direction. Rather than 
honoring the flawed processes of deliberation that take place in actual 
social life, these theorists turn to a hypothetical consensus that would 
presumably follow from a perfectly rational deliberative process.63 The 
philosophical game then becomes one of specifying the idealizing 
conditions for “rational” deliberation and rejecting the results of actual 
processes of social deliberation for not being close enough to the ideal (not 
being “rational” enough). At its most distorted, theorists use this version of 
deliberative theory to reject voting and other real indicia of social 
conviction in favor of whatever conclusion the theorist thinks is most 
rational—the conclusion the community would have arrived at if only the 
community had deliberated better—and, indeed, to call that conclusion the 
“democratic” one even if it has no substantial public support. As I discuss 
at greater length later in this Symposium, I think this rationalist version of 
deliberative democracy is a mistake of the first order.64 But nothing in the 
foundational ideas of the theory necessitates it. To say that a democratic 
community should be able to freely develop its political culture and project 
that culture into the realm of government is not to deny the importance of 
voting in elections and other more prosaic features of majoritarian 
governance; the deliberative features of democracy are necessary, not 
sufficient. To say that is also not to imply an exaggerated faith in the 
prospects for consensus or need for consensus,65 the likelihood that 
63 I discuss this issue at greater length in Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Justice, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2017). 
64 Id. 
65 For example, Habermas’s “discourse principle” holds that “[j]ust those action norms are valid to 
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.” HABERMAS, 
supra note 60, at 107. It should be said that this orientation to consensus is for Habermas a regulative 
ideal: democratic deliberation must be oriented to a consensus that is “possible in principle,” despite 
“overwhelming evidence of persistent dissensus” because only the orientation to consensus keeps 
discourse functioning according to its purpose, namely, ordering politics in a rational and noncoercive 
way for all. Jürgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477, 1491 (1996). Nonetheless, the idea of consensus is both much too 
demanding and not demanding enough. It is too demanding because it rejects what might be the 
foundational principle on which every large-scale, real democracy in the world operates: the principle 
of a fair vote. It is not demanding enough because it rests on a hypothetical assent and possible 
consensus rather than an actual decision undertaken by real people. The two flaws are related: an 
impossible standard can only be satisfied in imaginary conditions. To make the structure work, 
Habermas has to postulate that, in ideal communicative conditions, people will tend toward consensus, 
and so real discourse only fails to reach consensus because its communicative conditions fall short of 
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deliberative processes will reach true or best substantive conclusions,66 or 
the possibility or desirability of a collective consciousness into which 
individual citizens are incorporated (or subordinated).67 In fact, the 
deliberative program is not nearly so exotic as it might seem. As First 
Amendment scholar Robert Post has remarked, the version of deliberative 
democracy presented here is “the theory of the American First Amendment, 
which rests on the idea that if citizens are free to participate in the 
formation of public opinion, and if the decisions of the state are made 
responsive to public opinion, citizens will be able to experience their 
government as their own . . . .”68 
Indeed, I would suggest—taking inspiration from the American First 
Amendment tradition—that we extend the idea of deliberative democracy 
past the notion of express political deliberation to a broader conception of 
cultural self-formation, where “deliberation” just refers to the 
communicative processes by which culture (all culture, not just political 
culture) is fashioned, and “democracy” means that government responds to 
the culture thus formed.69 Put another way, democracy implies the freedom 
of the members of a political community to form themselves culturally and 
the subordination of government to the culture thus formed. If democracy 
is government “by, of, and for the people,” deliberative democracy is about 
the “of.” The exercise of political power, including the exercise of political 
power that is law, is democratic insofar as it is made from¾out of¾a 
community’s ethical life. This cultural extension of the deliberative 
tradition carries the tradition past where some deliberative democrats 
would want it to go, but others—in particular, a group of people who 
the ideal. I do not think human reason is capable of overcoming disagreement to this extent. But I see 
this insistence on consensus as native to Habermas’s particular brand of “discourse-theoretic” 
deliberative democracy, not deliberative democracy itself.  
66 See supra note 65. 
67 For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s famous presentation of how individual wills combine to 
form a general will, though a foundation stone in the deliberative tradition, seems so exaggerated as to 
be at once metaphysically implausible and, paradoxically, anti-democratic, even totalitarian: 
If, then, we eliminate from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we find it comes 
down to this: Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the 
supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an 
indivisible part of the whole. 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1762) (internal quotation marks omitted). What this gets right is the basic conceptual orientation—the 
idea of opinion formation in democratic societies as something very important and necessary to 
understand, and as something collective and intersubjective—but the extremity of Rousseau’s account 
is, in my view, his problem, not deliberative democracy’s. 
68 Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 27 (2006). 
69 I develop this thought later in this Symposium, where I write wholly for myself rather than for a 
collective. See Kleinfeld, Three Principles, supra note 63, at 1465–75. 
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straddle republican, communitarian, and deliberative ideas—think that the 
deliberative tradition at its best comes to a cultural conclusion.70 
Note, finally, that deliberative democracy is an anti-bureaucratic form 
of democratic theory. When citizens communicate about matters of 
political concern, obviously the laity is engaged and obviously they will 
reason in value rational terms about matters of substantive justice (though a 
deliberative democrat might hold that experts and officials play an essential 
part in good public deliberation, provided they contribute in nondominating 
ways—providing information, for example). When government heeds the 
command of public opinion or culture, obviously the bureaucracy is 
subordinated to the democracy (though, again, a deliberative democrat 
might well think these things typically go best when the bureaucracy is 
subordinated on questions of ends and enlisted on questions of means—a 
possibility Weber’s theory of bureaucracy can accommodate).71 The point 
surfaces in a particularly interesting way in Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action, a work of social theory that predates his major 
work on deliberative democracy and that focuses, under Weber’s influence, 
on a distinction between what Habermas terms “system” and “lifeworld.”72 
Those terms have an odd ring in English-speaking ears, but the essential 
70 Habermas is among those who do not agree with the cultural extension of deliberative theory. He 
notes that some “contemporary republicans,” who give “public communication a communitarian 
reading,” tend to look at politics in terms of explicating “a shared form of life or collective identity” and 
thus to treat political questions as “ethical questions where we, as members of a community, ask 
ourselves who we are and who we would like to be.” Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of 
Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 4 (1994). He objects because he thinks these ethical questions are 
“subordinate to moral questions . . . in the narrow sense of the Kantian tradition,” that is, “questions of 
justice.” Id. at 5. Philip Pettit also rejects this culturalist view and distinguishes it from his use of the 
term “republican”: 
I should mention that the tradition with which we identify is not the sort of tradition—
ultimately, the populist tradition—that hails the democratic participation of the people as one of 
the highest forms of good . . . . [T]he term ‘republican’ has come to be associated in many 
circles, probably under the influence of Hannah Arendt, with a communitarian and populist 
approach. Such an approach represents the people in their collective presence as master and the 
state as servant . . . . 
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 7–8 (1997) [hereinafter 
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM] (citations omitted). I’m with Arendt, though not necessarily in considering 
political participation to be the highest good. My view is that the use of political power in a democratic 
society must—in most ways and most of the time—reflect and express “We the People,” and there is no 
way in that process of reflection and expression to keep the political separate from the cultural. 
71 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
72 The work is in two volumes, and the very titles reveal Habermas’s Weberian inheritance and 
normative concern for the rise of bureaucratization that Weber brought to light: 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981); 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Beacon Press 1987) (1981). 
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idea is that the bureaucratization of political and economic processes splits 
modern societies into more and less bureaucratized parts. On the one hand, 
governments and markets create a set of institutional structures that operate 
according to the technical expertise and instrumental rationality of officials, 
experts, and administrators; this is the system world, the world of Weberian 
bureaucracy.73 On the other hand, we create through discourse and social 
practice a cultural world of shared meanings and values, which are either 
assumed and unexamined (in which case they are part of the lifeworld) or 
consciously contested (in which case they shift from the lifeworld to the 
sphere of communicative action and thus, in political contexts, to the public 
sphere).74 For example, it might be assumed in one phase of a society’s 
history that some linguistic convention is used to indicate respect for social 
superiors; the convention is at that time part of the lifeworld. If in a later 
phase of that society’s history, the linguistic convention and the assumption 
on which it is based come in for challenge, a deliberative conversation 
begins among members of the society in the public sphere. Habermas’s 
central normative idea in Theory of Communicative Action is that, in 
contemporary societies, the system world is increasingly colonizing the 
lifeworld—or, roughly translated, bureaucratic modes of thought are 
invading domains of cultural life that should be approached in 
nonbureaucratic ways.75 An example would be running universities 
according to the market principles of business. It was later in Habermas’s 
career that this view blossomed into a theory of democracy, but blossom it 
did: in a democratic society, he argues, the public sphere of communication 
and discourse exercises directive authority over law and policy, and thus 
over the system world of markets and government.76 If we think of the 
combination of lifeworld and public sphere as, in essence, a community’s 
culture, then one way to summarize Habermas’s thought is simply to say 
this: a democratic society is one in which the culture directs the 
government or, similarly, the community directs the bureaucracy.77 For an 
73 See 2 HABERMAS, supra note 72, at 118, 172–79. 
74 See id. at 118–40, 324–26. 
75 See 1 HABERMAS, supra note 72, at xl (stating that the two volumes aim to provide “a theory of 
modernity that explains the type of social pathologies that are today becoming increasingly visible, by 
way of the assumption that communicatively structured domains of life are being subordinated to the 
imperatives of autonomous, formally organized systems of action”); 2 HABERMAS, supra note 72, at 
323 (describing “a one-sided style of life and a bureaucratic desiccation of the political public sphere” 
when “the functional imperatives of highly formalized domains penetrate into the private and public 
sphere, that is, into spheres of the lifeworld in which sociation proceeds mainly by communicative 
means”). 
76 See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text. 
77 Note again, however, that Habermas later expressed opposition to extending his ideas about 
deliberative democracy to culture in this enlarged sense. See supra note 70. 
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anti-bureaucratic perspective like that of criminal justice democratizers, 
deliberative democracy is a good fit. 
We turn now from deliberative democratic theory to participatory 
democratic theory for an insight so startlingly simple that it might escape 
mention were it not for the fact that so many putatively democratic political 
theorists and governments have minimized it. The insight is just this: 
democracy means self-government.78 That is, democracy requires 
conveying government into the hands of the population living under that 
government—into the hands of “We the People”—for popular sovereignty 
implies a measure of popular rule, with all its attendant majoritarian 
implications and risks. The origins of this participatory conception of 
democracy are in ancient Athens, and the idea is radical in the way ancient 
Athenian democracy was radical. It carries implications well beyond the 
merely abstract idea of a government that represents its people or derives 
legitimacy from the people. Democracy etymologically means that the 
people rule; it requires that the people living under a government play a 
part in governmental decisionmaking and administration. If deliberative 
democracy illuminates the idea of government of the people, participatory 
democracy illuminates the idea of government by the people.79 The 
enduringly radical character of this idea is, I suspect, why so many 
politicians and theorists who claim to be democratic insist on elaborating 
the concept of democracy in ways that evade its popular-majoritarian 
implications. Yet radical or not, participatory democracy captures core 
elements of democratic practice, at least in the United States, among them 
jury service, occasional referenda, and direct rule in local settings (both 
governmental and nongovernmental). If we expand our concept of 
participatory democracy to include certain kinds of elections—admittedly 
not citizens making governmental decisions directly but citizens 
participating in government as voters, where the elections are of such a 
78 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 151 (1984) (“Strong democracy is defined by politics in the participatory mode: literally, it is self-
government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens. Active citizens 
govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently 
enough and in particular when basic policies are being decided and when significant power is being 
deployed.”); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42–43 (1970) (“The 
existence of representative institutions at [a] national level is not sufficient for democracy . . . 
socialisation, or ‘social training[,’] for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the 
necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes 
place through the process of participation itself . . . . Therefore, for a democratic polity to exist it is 
necessary for a participatory society to exist . . . .”). 
79 Perhaps it is a little gimmicky, but I find it useful to think that democracy is government “by, of, 
and for the people” where participatory democracy tracks the “by,” deliberative democracy tracks the 
“of,” and voting in elections tracks the “for.” See supra notes 56, 68–70 and accompanying text. 
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character that the winners are substantially under popular control—then 
participatory democracy helps explain the most basic and inescapable fact 
of American government: choosing leaders by majority vote. In fact, that 
practice might be the most basic and inescapable fact of all democratic 
government throughout the world. Any theory of democracy that aspires 
even to the most minimal descriptive joinder with the world must account 
for that practice somehow. 
Tocqueville thought the American democratic tradition was defined 
by exactly these ideals of majoritarian self-governance: 
 If there is any country in the world where one may hope to assess the true 
value of the dogma of popular sovereignty, to study its application to the 
affairs of society and judge its benefits and dangers, that country is surely 
America. . . . . 
 In America, the people choose those who make the law and those who 
carry it out. They constitute the juries that punish infractions of that law. 
Institutions are democratic not only in principle but in all their ramifications. 
For example, the people choose their representatives directly, and in general 
they do so every year, the better to ensure their subservience. Hence it is really 
the people who rule, and even though the form of government is 
representative, it is clear that there can be no durable obstacles capable of 
preventing the opinions, prejudices, interests, and even passions of the people 
from making their influence felt on the daily direction of society.  
 In the United States, as in every country where the people rule, it is the 
majority that governs in the people’s name.80 
The America Tocqueville observed was therefore profoundly egalitarian on 
a cultural level—as Tocqueville emphasized before all else—for popular 
sovereignty and self-government are profoundly egalitarian ideals.81 
Second only to this egalitarianism, American culture was majoritarian, with 
majority opinion commanding not just political power but “moral 
ascendency” and “power . . . over thought.”82 In American society, 
Tocqueville observed, the values and ideas that oriented public life bubbled 
up from the bottom and middle of the polity rather than descending from 
the top, and the common person rejected the intellectual dominance of an 
officialdom or a social elite and admitted no authority greater than his or 
her own.83 Meanwhile, politically, voting was the dominant mechanism of 
political life, with popular control over a huge range of offices and 
80 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62, 197 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
Library of Am. 2004) (1835). 
81 Id. at 3, 60. 
82 Id. at 284, 292. 
83 Id. at 52–61. 
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policies.84 Government was chiefly a local, community affair, and thus 
responsive to the attitudes of the immediate locale.85 American officials 
were not generally a separate class from the laity; rather, lay people took 
temporary and partial terms of office and officials transitioned into and out 
of private life (just as they had in ancient Athens).86 The jury was a vivid 
example. The early American jury was not the domesticated factfinder of 
today but, as Tocqueville argued, a governmental actor on a constitutional 
scale, almost a fourth branch.87 The jury functioned within the overall 
framework of checks and balances as a directly popular check on all three 
of the other branches, an arbiter over state action by the laity at the very 
moment of law’s application, and thus at the very moment law touched 
individual interests.88 
In describing democracy in this way, Tocqueville did not mean simply 
to sing a song of praise. He saw a great deal to fear in majoritarian 
democracy: the coarsening of manners and lowering of souls, the control 
by majority opinion over genuine freedom of thought, and the risk of a 
“tyranny of the majority.”89 Yet serious as those fears were and are, they 
can seem almost quaint today. Tocqueville could not have imagined the 
extremity of the problems to which the last two centuries have exposed us. 
Above all, the American experience has demonstrated the possibility of 
white supremacy amidst popular majoritarianism, the European experience 
has demonstrated the possibility of elected dictatorship, and the last century 
has shown us depths of racial and other in-group/out-group hatred that 
political thinkers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were not 
in a position to see, and that majoritarian government can weaponize. 
Popular self-government involves a grant of trust to the populace—at least 
to some extent, relative to the alternatives or as a corrective or control on 
the alternatives—and sometimes the public cannot be trusted. Some 
political thinkers are so alarmed by these risks that they basically turn 
against self-government. Unwilling to surrender the label “democracy,” 
they recast the concept in ways that effectively deny or dramatically 
minimize democracy’s popular-majoritarian core. Many of these political 
thinkers are implicitly Schumpeterian. They distrust popular deliberation or 
participation and prefer elite control, though possibly accountable elite 
84 Id. at 197. 
85 Id. at 67–94. 
86 Id. at 232–34. 
87 Id. at 311–18. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 283–300, 816–30. 
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control.90 They hold dear a set of substantive political values or a 
conception of justice unrelated to self-government and, if they are candid 
and self-aware, acknowledge that self-government is for them a secondary 
or instrumental good—as Schumpeter did91—or, if they are less candid and 
self-aware, redefine democracy so as to minimize the place of self-
government in the concept.92 Above all, they deny or minimize the 
importance of voting: fearing majorities, they long for a conception of 
democracy in which majority preferences and therefore majority votes are 
incidental, irrelevant, or highly controlled.93 
Yet serious as the concerns that give rise to this anti-majoritarian 
recasting of democracy are, it is the wrong response. The lesson of popular 
majoritarianism’s shortcomings is the need to balance majority rule with 
rights and the rule of law, to set up political and economic structures 
capable of protecting equal citizenship, to hem in populist demagogues by 
dividing power between multiple branches of government, and to fight for 
a culture of equality, freedom, and toleration. The lesson is to value both 
community self-determination and substantive justice, rather than to value 
only substantive justice and not community self-determination or to pretend 
that substantive justice is community self-determination. The lesson, in a 
word, is to be a pluralist about what decent government requires. This is 
not to say that “democracy” is majority rule and implies no thicker set of 
political values than that. Democracy does carry implications for 
substantive justice: to give all members of the community a voice and a 
vote, for example, is to insist on their equal moral standing. But the project 
of extracting an adequate conception of substantive justice from these 
90 See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
92 There are many examples of these political thinkers, but among the most vivid and influential is 
the former President (Chief Justice) of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, one of the most 
important figures in Israel’s political history and global legal history. Barak has, through extremely 
expansive interpretations of legal texts and principles, anchored the left-leaning Israeli judiciary’s 
resistance to right-leaning Israeli electoral forces that commonly win at the ballot box. 
Countermajoritarian? Undemocratic? Not necessarily, says Barak: 
The judiciary must be aware of the fundamental values of the people. It must balance them in 
accordance with the values of the “enlightened general public” in Israel. It must reflect the 
general public’s conscience, the social consensus, the legal ethics and the value judgments of 
society with regard to acceptable and unacceptable behavior . . . . A constitution is a living 
organism, and its interpretation must express the deep “I believe” of the society. 
Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and 
Its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 5 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
93 See, e.g., id. Providing a conception of democracy as purely an instrumental good was part of 
Schumpeter’s genius. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
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relatively thin democratic premises is, I think, unlikely to succeed, and the 
tendency to label one’s political values “democratic,” whatever those 
values are and whatever role they give or deny popular rule, is gravely 
misleading. “Democracy” has a meaning; it is not just a synonym for good 
government. Majoritarian self-government is necessary for democracy as 
such because at the irreducible core of democracy is popular sovereignty, 
but majoritarian self-government is not sufficient because democracy 
carries implications beyond majority rule. In turn, democracy is necessary 
to decent government because popular sovereignty is a treasure and a right, 
but it is not sufficient because decent government also requires elements of 
substantive justice that democracy alone does not supply. Conceptions of 
government that purport to be conceptions of democracy but so prioritize 
concern for minorities as to deny, rather than merely constrain, the right of 
majorities to collective self-determination have allowed the exception to 
swallow the rule. Conceptions of government that purport to be 
conceptions of democracy but so prioritize a substantive conception of 
justice or set of values as to render collective self-determination a 
secondary or merely instrumental good have failed to appreciate the 
normative force of the claim to popular sovereignty, or have failed the 
challenge of pluralism, or both. Conceptions of government that purport to 
be conceptions of democracy but cannot account for the absolutely central 
place of voting in all democracy as such—not a hypothetical consensus or 
“general will” but the actual rule of an actual majority after a fair vote—
have lost sight, not just of a mechanism of democratic governance, but of 
the popular sovereignty and collective self-determination the mechanism is 
designed to protect. These conceptions of “democracy” are anti-democratic 
in fact though they are unwilling to be so in name. There is no such thing as 
nonmajoritarian democracy. 
Anti-bureaucratic, deliberative, participatory—the three threads of 
democratic thought discussed thus far are naturally tied together. All three 
involve a conception of government in which political life is democratic 
insofar as it is closely linked to “We the People.” The fourth and last thread 
is less connected to the other three, but it is necessary if our concept of 
democracy is to capture the full range of ideas at work in the movement to 
democratize criminal justice. It is essentially a constitutional vision 
concerned with dispersing power for the sake of preserving individual 
liberty. Among contemporary political philosophers, its leading advocate is 
Philip Pettit. 
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Pettit terms the view “republicanism” and it has three parts.94 The first 
is a distinct conception of individual freedom, which Pettit terms “freedom 
as non-domination”: to be free is not just an absence of interference but a 
right not to be subjected to the whim of any other person.95 The Romans 
thought of this as the condition of living without a dominus, a master: a full 
citizen is someone protected by law from domination, someone who can 
look any other person in the eyes “without fear or deference.”96 Thus, rather 
than the traditional opposition between equality and liberty, the two here 
are related: equality is the root of freedom, and freedom is the consequence 
of equality. Furthermore, this conception of freedom and equality entails 
the rule of law because a right not to be subjected to the whim of any other 
person must be a legally protected condition rather than just a contingent 
circumstance (or it would be the mere absence of interference). Thus the 
root idea of freedom as nondomination brings in its train, as it were, other 
core values. Second is the idea of constitutionalism and, with it, the “mixed 
constitution”: state power should not be absolute, unified, or perpetual but 
under the rule of law and divided among multiple officials in a position to 
check one another.97 This is of course the concept of constitutional checks 
and balances, here enlisted in the service of the ideal of freedom as 
nondomination: power must be broken up and dispersed or some person, 
group, or entity will be in the position of a dominus and everyone else will 
be that person, group, or entity’s subjects. Third and finally, the republican 
tradition endorses the idea of what Pettit terms “a contestatory citizenry”: a 
public rambunctious and independent enough to serve as an ultimate check 
on government should government drift too far away from the people to 
whom it is supposed to answer, and a system of government that provides 
channels by which citizens can, in some form (not necessarily by voting), 
contest state policy and action.98 
One might wonder: where is majoritarian self-government—or indeed 
any form of collective self-determination—in this version of democracy? 
94 See PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF
DEMOCRACY 5–8 (2012) [hereinafter PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS]; see also PETTIT, 
REPUBLICANISM, supra note 70. The term “republican” is slippery: Pettit is at pains to distinguish his 
republicanism from a more deliberative and participatory version that he regards as populist, see supra 
note 70 and accompanying text, and it is not clear which version, if either, corresponds to the use of that 
term in early America, see supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
95 PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 94, at 5; see also PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra 
note 70, at 51–80. 
96 PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 94, at 17. 
97 Id. at 5; see also PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 70, at 171–83. 
98 PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS, supra note 94, at 5–6; see also PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, 
supra note 70, at 183–205. 
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The answer, alas, is that Pettit is one of those putatively democratic 
theorists who substantially defines self-government out of democracy.99 
Individual freedom is his quarry; “the instruments of democratic control, 
participatory or representative” are only “a means of furthering liberty.”100 
What there is of the people’s rule on his theory is to be found only in the 
contestability criterion: 
The non-arbitrariness of public decisions comes of their meeting, not the 
condition of having originated or emerged according to some consensual 
process, but the condition of being such that if they conflict with the perceived 
interests and ideas of the citizens, then the citizens can effectively contest 
them. . . . 
. . . Democracy, as ordinarily understood, is connected with consent; it is 
almost exclusively associated with the popular election of the personnel in 
government, or at least with the popular election of the members of the 
legislature. But democracy may be understood, without unduly forcing 
intuitions, on a model that is primarily contestatory rather than consensual.101 
Contestation does provide Pettit with some elements of what is standardly 
understood as democratic, but “[i]t breaks with any notion of democracy 
that would consecrate majority opinion.”102 
Yet if one regards Pettit’s version of republicanism, not as a complete 
theory of democracy or government, but just as a powerful insight about 
freedom and the constitutional conditions in which freedom can be secured, 
then the theory provides something quite useful to the movement to 
democratize criminal justice—something missing from the anti-
bureaucratic, deliberative, and participatory theories of democracy 
discussed above. Pettit’s republicanism provides a way of thinking about 
the place of individual freedom, the rule of law, and constitutionalism in 
the theory of democracy. From Pettit, we can add to our mix of ideas the 
notion, for example, that police and prosecutors in the contemporary 
operation of American criminal justice may enjoy a form of domination 
inconsistent with democratic freedom, that the constitutional structures 
undergirding American criminal justice should disperse power more than 
they presently do, or that the individuals and communities most hard-
pressed by the criminal justice system should be better able to contest its 
operation than they presently can. These contentions and others like them 
are part of the big tent of democratic thinking in the movement to 
democratize criminal justice. 
99 See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
100 PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 70, at 30. 
101 Id. at 185. 
102 Id. at 202. 
111:1367 (2017) Manifesto 
1397 
II. DEMOCRATIZATION VERSUS BUREAUCRATIC PROFESSIONALIZATION
All of these ideas—Weber’s, Habermas’s, Tocqueville’s, and
Pettit’s—are complex and an extremely brief survey of the kind above of 
course involves extreme compression. But I like to think there is a certain 
poetry in brevity and something to be gained from the effort to distill 
simple essences from complex ideas. What is to be gained in this case is the 
ability to see the degree to which these four bodies of thought can be pulled 
together. “Democracy” as we use that term in the movement to democratize 
criminal justice refers to a form of criminal law and procedure that is 
responsive to the laity rather than solely to officials and experts; that cares 
about prudential, equitable, and individualized moral judgment rather than 
merely formal rule compliance and technical expertise; that is more value 
rational than instrumentally rational; that submits the law and 
administration of criminal justice to public deliberation and to the values 
embedded in the way we live together as a culture, rather than treating it 
mainly as a tool of social management under the control of our institutional 
bureaucracies; that is substantially given into the hands of local 
communities as an instrument of collective self-determination and cultural 
self-creation; but that channels popular rule into constitutional forms meant 
to resist domination, disperse power, and permit contestation by a restless 
and animated citizenry. Our conception of democracy is thus anti-
bureaucratic, deliberative, and participatory under a constitutional 
structure. Or to put all that in as few words as I can muster: the 
democratization movement stands for the “We the People” principle in 
criminal justice. 
The most accurate term for the rival of our view would be 
bureaucratization. For that is the polarity: not democracy versus tyranny 
but democracy versus bureaucracy. And bureaucratization, not in a 
pejorative sense but in the technical sense Weber identifies, is what 
members of the rival camp really endorse. James Whitman’s Harsh Justice, 
for example, is a paean to the humaneness of strong, insulated, bureaucratic 
criminal administration and a condemnatory study of what he sees as the 
vengeful punitiveness of democratic publics.103 A major focus of John 
Langbein’s career is his sustained opposition to the jury and defense of 
criminal procedure by officials and experts—precisely because he 
recognizes in an uncommonly clear-eyed way that the jury is an institution 
of the laity, inconsistent with the rule of officials and experts, and because 
he acknowledges in an uncommonly candid way that he regards the laity as 
103 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). 
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ignorant and irrational and the rule of officials and experts as relatively 
rational and decent.104 David Garland’s Culture of Control and Peculiar 
Institution, while very different books, are aligned in their fear of the 
American public, pictured in Culture of Control as reactionary and in 
Peculiar Institution as bigoted.105 My personal shorthand for their views—
not wholly fair, to be sure, but I think revealing, again in the sense that 
extreme compression can be revealing—is that Whitman views the 
American public as, above all, violent; Langbein views the American 
public as, above all, stupid; and Garland views the American public as, 
above all, racist. Each traces the American criminal system’s dysfunctions 
to the toxic combination of popular rule with a bad populace, and each 
turns to bureaucratic governance as a solution. They are far from alone in 
this: versions of their views can be heard in the work of Michelle 
Alexander,106 Michael Tonry,107 Nicola Lacey,108 and many, many others, 
both scholarly and popular. The view is so often and so casually repeated 
that it has become the dominant narrative of the criminal justice crisis in 
American intellectual life. Our criminal system is harsh because the 
American public wants it that way, the narrative goes; naturally, the 
solution is to defang the public. But there is a counternarrative, itself with 
many adherents, in which the dysfunctions of American criminal justice 
trace back mainly to problems of bureaucratic modes of thought and 
governance; naturally, the solution is to curb and counterbalance the 
bureaucracy. Democracies as such are not relentlessly harsh on this view, 
nor is American democracy relentlessly harsh—in fact, the bulk of 
historical evidence suggests the opposite.109 If this Symposium contributes 
nothing else, I hope that it at least unsettles the dominant narrative. Among 
those who have studied or worked within criminal justice professionally, 
104 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003). 
105 DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABOLITION (2010); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001). 
106 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
107 MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL 
CULTURE (2004). 
108 Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice or 
Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1299 (2013) (reviewing STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE 
MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012)). 
109 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. It may be true that American voters turned punitive 
in an era of extremely high crime—rather unsurprisingly, and not unreasonably—but that is not a 
deeply rooted cultural feature of democracies as such, nor of Americans. See supra notes 9–10 and 
accompanying text. 
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there are some who agree with the dominant narrative and others who do 
not. The matter is not obvious; there is an argument to be had here. 
The term “bureaucracy,” although the most conceptually accurate 
characterization of what our rival view endorses, carries such negative 
connotations in American political culture that it seems tendentious to call 
our rivals “bureaucratizers.” An alternative term might be 
“professionalizers,” but that seems unfair to us, the democratizers, as we by 
no means oppose professionalization so long as lay voices are not 
suppressed. To call our rival “anti-democratizers” is perhaps acceptable if 
the term is taken to mean that they would not further democratize criminal 
justice and perhaps would pull back on the democratic elements already 
there, but many of them are, at bottom, not anti-democracy so much as 
Schumpeterian or otherwise in favor of some very minimal conception of 
democracy, at least in the criminal justice context.110 I suggest, then, that 
we use for the opposition the hybrid term “bureaucratic professionalizers.” 
So the battle is joined between democratizers and bureaucratic 
professionalizers. The bureaucratic professionalizers believe in a form of 
criminal law and procedure that reduces the role of the laity and increases 
the role of officials and experts; that favors formal rule compliance and/or 
technical expertise over prudential, individualized moral judgment; that 
regards criminal law and administration as properly a tool of instrumentally 
rational social management rather than cultural self-expression; and that 
regards popular, local government as inappropriate for criminal justice 
purposes. In so characterizing our rival’s view, let me emphasize that I do 
not regard this view as unreasonable or without some evidentiary support, 
and I hope I have not characterized it unfairly. The point here is not to win 
the argument. The point is to get to the bottom of what the argument is 
about. 
So much for characterizing the concept of democracy at issue in our 
movement and the concept of bureaucratic professionalization on the other 
side. Three caveats bear emphasis. First, democracy is a “more or less,” not 
an “either/or” concept. It is coherent to think some arrangement of the 
criminal system, while not being undemocratic, is less democratic than it 
should be, or vice versa. By the same token, one might be a democratizer 
who does not subscribe to every aspect of the multifaceted conception of 
democracy sketched above, or one might be a democratizer who does not 
think every aspect of the criminal system should be democratized. There is, 
in particular, a range of opinion within the democratization movement on 
the degree to which criminal justice should be open to the sort of popular-
110 See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
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majoritarian control Tocqueville described. A difficulty in writing on 
behalf of a collective is illuminating common ground and constraining the 
range of within-group disagreement without thereby insisting on a false 
consensus. Perfect consensus here is unnecessary. People who are 
indubitably members of the democratization movement might, for example, 
trust the people’s judgment on criminal matters at retail, as when serving 
on juries, but not at wholesale, as when voting. Some members of the 
movement believe in community policing while also thinking that effective 
and efficient community policing requires expertise, training, and social 
scientific knowledge (which democratizers by no means oppose). Some 
members of the movement think criminal justice should not necessarily be 
directed by lay citizens but simply that lay citizens should be included in 
dialogue with experts and officials to a greater extent than they are now. 
For that, in the final analysis, is the question—not “How democratic should 
an ideal criminal system be?” but “How democratic should the criminal 
system be relative to what it is now?” In a big tent movement, it is enough 
to think the arrow of reform points toward more democracy, not less. 
Second, to favor democratizing criminal justice is not necessarily to 
favor democratization in all walks of life. There might be special reasons to 
think criminal justice ought to be more democratic than other areas of 
governance. Just to speak of my own views by way of example, I have 
argued that the criminal system has a distinctive social function: to restitch 
a torn social fabric in the wake of a crime, to reconstruct a community’s 
violated normative order after wrongs that expressively attack that 
normative order, and thereby to secure a necessary form of social solidarity 
around shared norms.111 That conception of criminal justice’s purpose 
counsels in favor of a democratic governance structure in criminal law and 
procedure because the goal of cultural restitching and social solidarity ill 
fits technical administration; it calls for lay involvement and community 
values.112 But that solidaristic purpose is the goal of criminal law: nothing 
in a view like mine suggests democratizing, say, monetary policy or 
environmental regulation. While I confess to radical democratic leanings 
across the board, on balance I think areas like monetary policy and 
environmental regulation are good candidates for instrumental rationality 
and generally good technical administration. Others have their own reasons 
to single out criminal justice for democratic treatment. Our question is not 
“How democratic should government be?” but “How democratic should the 
111 Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism, supra note 16. 
112 I expand on this point in Kleinfeld, Three Principles, supra note 63, a separate essay in this 
Symposium. This Manifesto, although a sole-authored piece, is meant to identify ideas members of the 
democratization movement share, while Three Principles is just about my own views. 
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criminal system be?” Or rather, to combine this point with the last one: 
“How democratic should the criminal system be relative to what it is 
now?” 
Finally, it should be obvious that the robustly normative conception of 
democracy laid out above is not satisfied merely by observing that, say, a 
piece of criminal legislation survived the constitutionally mandated 
lawmaking process. Congress might pass a criminal statute and the 
president sign it into law without that statute thereby satisfying our 
normative conception of what it means for a criminal statute to be 
adequately democratic, unless one holds the view, which seems to me 
wildly naive, that the present state of American federal lawmaking is 
everything democratic governance should be. Likewise, a prosecutor who 
pleads out 95% of her felony cases might have won an election without that 
practice of plea bargaining thereby satisfying our normative conception of 
what it means for criminal procedure to be adequately democratic, unless 
one thinks both that democracy amounts to nothing more than exercising 
power after winning elections and that prosecutorial elections are 
everything they should be. A normative conception of democracy is a tool 
of political critique, not a positivistic legal checklist. 
III. THE DESIGN OF THIS SYMPOSIUM AND SOME EMERGENT THEMES
The contributions to this Symposium fall into certain thematic groups.
Those thematic groups are the basis for the organization of this Symposium 
into sections. They are also a guide to some of the unifying ideas at work in 
the democratization movement. 
The first unifying idea is that the U.S. Constitution, which speaks at 
length to criminal law and procedure, has a design principle for the 
criminal system, and the principle is a democratic one—a principle of 
community voice, citizen participation, federalism, checks and balances, 
and fragmented powers. Laura Appleman develops this theme with 
reference to the criminal jury.113 The grand jury for most of its history was 
not and was not meant to be a rubber-stamp, she argues, and the trial jury 
was not meant to be an occasional factfinder. The jury was not even viewed 
primarily as a right of the accused, to be asserted or foregone according to 
the preference of the accused. The jury was rather conceptualized in terms 
of a local community’s right to supervise the administration of its criminal 
justice, representing the populace in approving all criminal proceedings and 
all criminal liability on factual, legal, and equitable grounds, with full 
113 Laura I Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal Justice, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1413 (2017).
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supervisory authority over the criminal instrument. Juries were thus part of 
self-government itself, a “constitutional actor,”114 and much of our current 
dysfunction traces back to the loss of this institution and the vision of self-
government it represents. The project of repair, Appleman argues, requires 
building popular participation and decisionmaking back into the criminal 
system, not only by renewing the grand and trial juries but also by 
enhancing popular participation in other criminal justice contexts, such as 
bail, sentencing, and plea bargaining. 
Jed Rakoff—formerly both a prosecutor and a criminal defense 
attorney and now a trial judge—focuses on the office of the prosecutor, 
arguing that the growth of plea bargaining and related legal developments 
have made prosecutors staggeringly powerful relative to the other actors in 
criminal justice cases.115 The unintended side effect of a world of plea 
bargaining is that, rather than the constitutionally envisioned structure of 
two advocates depending for decision on a neutral judge or jury, 
prosecutors more than anyone else now exercise the adjudicative function 
of determining guilt and sentence. With that dual power of pursuing cases 
and determining their outcome, prosecutors have come to be, not 
“advocates” but “rulers.”116 The resulting system bears no relation to what 
the citizenry envisions, what the Founders intended, or what due process 
should allow; it is a system of unchecked power unlike anything else in our 
government, and, Rakoff argues, mass incarceration is one of the results. 
Rakoff proposes that, other solutions having run aground, all prosecutors 
should be required to serve by rotation as public defenders for indigent 
defendants so that they might at least develop sympathies more balanced 
than they can in the prosecutorial role alone. 
The last author on constitutional matters, Richard Bierschbach, turns 
from particular institutions to overall design.117 He argues that the 
constitutional arrangements for determining punishment reflect a structural 
principle related but not identical to checks and balances and to federalism, 
a principle he terms “fragmentation”118: power to determine punishment is 
divided between community actors and governmental officials, divided 
again among multiple kinds of governmental officials, and divided in a 
third way among communities and officials at the local, state, and national 
114 Id. at 1419. 
115 Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What Can Be Done 
About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429 (2017). 
116 Id. at 1430. 
117 Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of 
Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2017). 
118 Id. at 1438. 
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levels. Fragmentation not only controls the risk of coercive abuse but also 
fosters a deliberative conversation among diverse stakeholders on criminal 
justice issues, and thus advances a series of democratic values: that no 
single actor should hold too much power in determining punishments; that 
all those affected by the administration of punishment should have a say in 
it; and that the perspectives and values represented in decisions about 
punishment should be pluralistic in the way American culture is pluralistic. 
By thus fostering deliberation among diverse perspectives, Bierschbach 
believes that punishment can be made to reflect what Madison called the 
“cool and deliberate sense of the community”119—that is, the community 
when it is cool and deliberate, for Bierschbach is a committed but quite 
moderate democratizer. Among the things that have gone wrong in 
American criminal justice, Bierschbach argues, is that fragmentation’s 
democratic promise has been stymied and punishment policy has fallen 
under the control of a subset of powerful, self-interested, and one-sided 
interest groups. But we “cannot and should not abandon the Constitution’s 
fragmented approach to crime and punishment.”120 Rather, through policy 
intervention and, particularly, through well-crafted constitutional law 
doctrine, we can “look for ways to make different loci of influence and 
representation more meaningful . . . to do more to make sure that multiple 
voices are heard.”121 
Missing from this constitutional conversation, a founding father of the 
democratization point of view, is Bill Stuntz. He would have been among 
us had he lived.122 In any case, these constitutional arguments, which have a 
lawyerly character befitting the Constitution’s foundational position in 
American law, comprise the first section of the Symposium: 
“Constitutional Foundations: Institutional Design and Community Voice.” 
The second unifying idea is philosophical: it is that criminal justice 
must have a communitarian character in virtue of the distinctive role it is 
119 Id. at 1454 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 327 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001)). 
120 Id. at 1450–51. 
121 Id. at 1451. 
122 Consider, for example, Stuntz’s arguments that the cause of American criminal justice’s 
severity is not chiefly voters’ harshness but prosecutors’ incentives; that common law mens rea 
standards, because of their moralistic and open-ended character, open up a necessary space for 
nontechnical argumentation about culpability and equity in criminal justice trials; that criminal justice 
should generally be in the hands of local neighborhoods; that, in particular, prosecutors should be 
elected from highly local community units like neighborhoods rather than from large counties; that it is 
juries’ role to use the power of nullification to exercise mercy and keep state officials in line; that 
criminal law’s expressive qualities are key to its proper functioning; that one of the problems with 
excessive criminalization is the diminishment of that expressive function; and that alienation is key to 
the crime/race problem. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEFINING CRIMES 104, 181–82, 
190–201 (2011); STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 283–87, 305–07; Stuntz, supra note 22, at 520–23. 
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called upon to play in society’s basic structure. Antony Duff arrives at this 
theme by approaching criminal theory as a subset of political philosophy: 
his mission for many years has been to uncover the principles of criminal 
law and procedure entailed if we start from our prior commitment to living 
as citizens of a liberal and democratic republic.123 With respect to 
criminalization, he draws on liberalism’s traditional concern for the 
distinction between the public and private realms to argue that criminal law 
should define as offenses only those acts of wrongdoing that breach the 
values governing public life, and thus properly concern the community as a 
whole. With respect to procedure, he defends a normative ideal of the trial 
as a method by which a community calls offenders to account before the 
community for wrongs to the community, thus giving “concrete form to the 
citizens’ collective commitment to the polity’s self-defining values” and 
recognizing one another “as fellow members of the normative political 
community.”124 With respect to punishment, he argues that principles of 
equal citizenship constrain the manner in which a democratic community 
punishes, requiring that we find modes of punishment that, because they 
reflect the offender’s status as a member of the community bearing the 
respect due that civic status, condemn without excluding. Throughout, his 
larger theme is that criminal law in a democracy must be something a 
community of equal citizens can call their own—“a common law in the 
sense that it belongs to the citizens as an expression and implementation of 
their shared public values” and an element of “self-governance” in the 
sense that “lay citizens . . . have active roles to play” because “democracy 
should be participatory rather than merely representative.”125 This is a 
normative ideal; it has not been realized in practice. Its point is to provide 
normative direction for practice. 
John Braithwaite, a leading figure in the restorative justice movement, 
argues here that a restorative criminal system would be both democratic 
itself and “a key institution for renewing the democratic character of a 
society” more broadly.126 Restorative justice has always had communitarian 
roots: it sees the problem of crime not in terms of positivistic legal 
violations but in terms of fractured relationships, and it thus focuses on 
bringing the ordinary people involved in crimes (offenders, victims, their 
families, etc.) together to repair those relationships. Braithwaite here argues 
that restorative justice has, in particular, a special relationship to 
123 R A Duff, A Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491 (2017). 
124 Id. at 1499. 
125 Id. at 1501, 1503. 
126 John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice That Revives Republican Democracy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
1507, 1521 (2017). 
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deliberative and participatory democracy because, in restorative 
proceedings, stakeholders exercise “participatory process control” in 
criminal matters rather than relying wholly on state officials and formal 
legal structures.127 He also argues that the prospects of democracy on a 
broader level, outside the criminal justice context, require bringing 
democracy into the judicial branch—fostering “democracy in the 
administration of the rule of law,” giving “citizens some meaningful 
democratic empowerment over matters they care about and care to 
participate in.”128 He urges us to see the criminal justice system “as more 
than a check and balance, more than a protection against crime” but as a 
“frontline institution of struggle for democracy without domination,” 
because it is in the criminal context that people experience the most direct 
forms of domination (victims by crime and offenders by police and 
punishment), and it is in the criminal context that victims, offenders, and 
others most want and need voice.129 Criminal law at its best is thus “a 
seedbed of democracy.”130 
I write separately in this section to defend my theory of criminal law 
as “normative reconstruction,” which is in some respects a way of pushing 
Duff’s and Braithwaite’s communitarian ideas of criminal law to a higher 
level of abstraction.131 Criminal law has a distinctive social function, I 
argue, oriented to maintaining social solidarity in the wake of conduct 
whose nature is such as to attack the normative foundations on which social 
life is based. If criminal law is to perform that social function, it must have 
a democratic organization. I then try to articulate three principles of a 
democratic criminal system—one for criminalization (the “moral culture 
principle”), one for punishment (the “principle of prosocial punishment”), 
and one for procedure (the “We the People” principle).132 Our three 
philosophical arguments comprise the second section of the Symposium: 
“Philosophical Foundations: Criminal Law’s Democratic Nature.” 
The third and fourth unifying ideas are empirical: first, that 
compliance with criminal law depends on the people subject to it seeing 
that the law substantively comports with their sense of justice and 
procedurally comports with their sense of fairness, and, second, that the lay 
sense of justice and fairness is not inordinately punitive or otherwise 
unreasonable. The first point about the conditions of compliance is crucial 
127 Id. at 1521. 
128 Id. at 1519. 
129 Id. at 1523. 
130 Id. at 1522. 
131 Kleinfeld, Three Principles, supra note 63, at 1458, 1463–64. 
132 Id. at 1456–57.  
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because there may be no solution to American criminal law’s punitiviteness 
if we cannot also control the country’s tendency to very high rates of 
crime—for no democratic society can be expected simply to endure 
extreme levels of personal insecurity without trying to get a hold of the 
situation somehow. Proposals to reform American criminal justice must not 
be indifferent to the crime rate. The second point about the reasonableness 
of lay intuitions is crucial because the anti-democratization narrative vitally 
depends on the belief that Americans want punitiviteness, that American 
law is harsh because ordinary Americans are harsh, which is why the 
criminal system cannot be in ordinary Americans’ hands. What the 
empirics essentially show is that controlling the crime rate is impossible 
without normative buy-in from the community and that the norms at work 
in the community are not crazy, cruel, or dangerous. Procedurally, what 
people want is to be treated with dignity. And substantively, what they 
want is a fairly mild form of proportional punishment. 
Tom Tyler, a leading voice in the procedural justice movement, 
focuses on the procedural side: what makes people respect legal, and in 
particular, police authority enough to comply with it, he finds, is 
legitimacy, which depends centrally on police going about their jobs in 
ways that the community regards as procedurally fair.133 Police should thus 
focus not just on fighting or preventing crime but on winning communities’ 
trust by exemplifying procedural justice. Tracey Meares, another leading 
voice in the procedural justice movement, also thematizes procedural 
justice and the police but in a different way: people regard police as 
representatives of the state, and thus how police treat them sends messages 
about whether they are full citizens. These messages are key to 
understanding why procedural justice matters so much to people. The 
“centerpiece” of decades of research on procedural justice “is that people 
are motivated to comply with the law, cooperate with authorities, and 
engage with them when they are treated fairly,” and indeed that such 
procedural fairness has “much more” effect on compliance, cooperation, 
and engagement than either “favorable outcomes or the effectiveness of 
authorities at combatting crime.”134 The reason procedural justice has such 
effects, Meares argues, is that fair treatment transmits a message of 
membership, of belonging, which matters to people’s sense of identity, 
relationship to the state, and relationship to other groups within society. 
Too often in American society, the way police interact with members of 
133 Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals of 
American Policing in the 21st Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017). 
134 Tracey L. Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase 
Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1531–32 (2017). 
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marginalized groups conveys a “hidden curriculum” that those members 
are “an undesirable and dangerous class of people different from everyone 
else—‘anti-citizens.’”135 Reversing that message—creating an atmosphere 
of common citizenship by training police to treat people according to 
principles of procedural justice—is key to controlling the crime rate and 
building a more equal society. Meares and Tyler are empirical social 
scientists, not philosophers, but their views are amenable to a philosophical 
characterization. The foundations of procedural justice are communitarian 
and solidaristic. Philosophy and empirics are aligned: what most predicts 
legal compliance is democratic citizenship—the rationally grounded sense 
of oneself as a full and equal member of society with a non-alienated 
relationship to the state and its law. 
Paul Robinson turns from procedure to substantive criminal law and 
punishment and emerges—after decades of empirical research—with four 
basic findings, which are clearly true of Americans and appear to be widely 
true of diverse peoples throughout the world (although for present purposes 
I will focus on Americans). First, Americans across all demographic 
divisions exhibit a staggering degree of agreement about the relative 
blameworthiness of different crimes, and their judgments of relative 
blameworthiness respond to changes in the underlying facts of the crimes 
in ways that are both highly nuanced and highly consistent across diverse 
test subjects. Second, Americans want the law to punish in accord with 
relative blameworthiness, which they consider a basic requirement of 
justice. Third, Americans’ willingness to comply with the law depends on 
whether they believe punishment accords with justice, that is to say, with 
whether they think punishment in their society is proportional to relative 
blameworthiness. And fourth, crucially, Americans favor much less 
draconian levels of punishment than American law currently prescribes, 
provided the issues are presented outside of the kind of bumper-sticker 
political context that leads people simply to declare (and vote) their 
partisan identities.136 Robinson’s, Meares’s, and Tyler’s findings comprise 
the third section of the Symposium: “Empirical Foundations: Shared 
Norms, Lay Intuitions, Compliance, and Legitimacy.”137 
135 Id. at 1529–30. 
136 Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of 
Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565 (2017). 
137 Note that historical and comparative research supports these psychological findings. In 
particular, Randolph Roth’s magisterial analysis of homicide rates across time and place concludes that 
four factors are decisive in bringing or keeping homicide rates down:  
1. The belief that government is stable and that its legal and judicial institutions are unbiased
and will redress wrongs and protect lives and property. 2. A feeling of trust in government and
the officials who run it, and a belief in their legitimacy. 3. Patriotism, empathy, and fellow
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These constitutional, philosophical, and empirical arguments might 
persuade no one if democratization were unable to offer an adequate 
response to the problem of racial justice, for that problem runs to the very 
roots of the anti-democratization point of view. The historical link between 
racism and populism in the Jim Crow Era is imprinted on American 
lawyers’ souls. It was federal judges and other national, appointed officials 
who fought racist, local communities in that era; it was racist, local 
communities that enlisted the police and other instrumentalities of criminal 
law as white supremacy’s enforcement arm.138 And today, the racialized 
patterns in American policing and punishment spur many to conclude that 
racism is still the core wrong of American criminal justice and the core 
cause of the criminal system’s dysfunction.139 No wonder the dominant 
narrative of American criminal justice reform is an anti-democratic one. 
This brings us to the fifth unifying idea of the movement: that 
democratic values and institutional arrangements represent the best hope 
for the future of racial justice in criminal law. Bill Stuntz argued in his last 
work that a racially oppressive criminal system presents racial justice 
advocates with a choice: to place control over the criminal system in the 
hands of national officials and experts, trusting that those national officials 
and experts will oppose (and succeed in combating) the racial oppression, 
or to place control over the criminal system in the hands of local 
communities, including poor, black neighborhoods, on the grounds that a 
just and functional criminal system means making those communities 
masters of their own fates.140 Stuntz thought the latter presented the best 
prospects for racial justice in criminal law. In this Symposium, Jocelyn 
Simonson constructs a related argument for fighting racial injustice, not by 
relying on the “privileged insiders” who run the system already, but 
through local, participatory democracy within precisely those “poor 
populations of color most likely to come into contact with the system as 
feeling arising from racial, religious, or political solidarity. 4. The belief that the social 
hierarchy is legitimate, that one’s position in society is or can be satisfactory and that one can 
command the respect of others without resorting to violence. 
ROTH, supra note 25, at 17–18. It is remarkable how closely this historical and comparative research 
affirms the social scientific, psychological research on criminal law compliance that Meares, Tyler, and 
Robinson develop. And it is remarkable how closely both sets of empirical findings support the 
philosophical communitarianism that Duff, Braithwaite, and I defend. 
138 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 93–97, 187–92, 374–80. 
139 ALEXANDER, supra note 106, at 2 (arguing that “[w]hat has changed since the collapse of Jim 
Crow” is that “it is no longer socially permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justification for 
discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt,” so “we use our criminal justice system to label people 
of color ‘criminals’ and then engage in all the practices we supposedly left behind”). 
140 STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 15–40. 
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arrestees, defendants, or victims.”141 Her vision is one of democratic 
contestation at a grassroots level through such practices as copwatching, 
courtwatching, and community bail funds: “If I can insert one idea into this 
Symposium issue . . . it is that we should not be content with inviting the 
voices and viewpoints of the marginalized into our existing institutions; we 
also need to support outside mechanisms of agonistic participation and 
create new spaces for contestation.”142 For it is from those “most harmed by 
the punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most 
profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local 
demands for justice and equality.”143 
To Stuntz’s and Simonson’s arguments, I would like to append my 
own conviction that the poor, black neighborhoods most affected by crime 
are also the neighborhoods most affected by excessive punishment and 
policing, and if anyone is to calibrate the costs and benefits of both aright, 
it is those same neighborhoods. The costs and benefits of crime and 
punishment must fall together into the hands of those with control over the 
criminal system. That is a version of the democratic principle that those 
affected by a decision should have a voice in the decision. The people 
arresting and imprisoning an offender who frightens or angers them must 
also recognize the offender as an intelligible part of their cultural universe; 
that local knowledge and understanding will lead to smarter, more 
discerning punishment. The people arresting and imprisoning an offender 
should also experience the offender as a person who matters to them and 
whose loss therefore matters to them—not a distant “other” but a son, 
brother, father, member. The local community will typically be more 
measured in its response to such offenders than distant officials 
accountable to expert communities or independent voting blocs. 
Occasionally, the local community might also be more severe. That is its 
right. The goal is not just less severity but less reckless severity. 
Another part of the concept of democracy in racial justice is the idea 
of equal citizenship. It is this idea that Dorothy Roberts highlights with her 
eloquently simple point that “my criminal law scholarship over the last 
twenty-six years has been a democratizing project.”144 The demand that 
animates Roberts’s work—the demand for equal citizenship—is the 
demand for democracy. It is not a demand for majority rule, but it is a 
141 Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1610 (2017). 
142 Id. at 1613. 
143 Id.  
144 Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1597, 1598 (2017). 
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demand for democracy’s premise: the premise of equal standing and 
equally sharing in the political community. To this argument I would like 
to add my own conviction that for democratization of criminal justice to 
work, federal judges will need to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in 
the criminal justice context much more broadly, and enforce it much more 
vigorously, than they presently do. Even a committed democratizer can 
recognize the need for checks and balances, and the most important check 
and balance on majority rule in the criminal context is to require that the 
law for thee is also the law for me. Furthermore, a strong Equal Protection 
Clause in criminal justice is not just a control on democracy’s excesses. It 
is part of democracy itself, recognizing, in the tradition of John Hart Ely, 
that there are certain forms of democratic failure that afflict majoritarian 
systems and require judicial correction, particularly where minorities are 
concerned.145 Such judicial correction is not undemocratic; it is the 
perfection of democracy. 
Finally, Jonathan Simon and Jocelyn Simonson both highlight 
democracy’s transformative potential in the racial justice context. Simon 
argues that the carceral state has a racial character that a majority of 
Americans, including a slim majority of white Americans, have come to 
regard as illegitimate.146 This growing public conviction presents a 
possibility of radical change that could never be achieved through 
bureaucratic mechanisms alone. Likewise, Simonson argues that only 
democratic forces would or, in the United States, could abolish and remake 
the criminal landscape.147 
The sixth unifying idea of the movement is that, while the criminal 
justice clock cannot and, on balance, should not be wound back to a pre-
bureaucratic era, it is realistically possible to inject democratic elements 
into a bureaucratized system. Stephanos Bibas argues that the quest for 
efficiency is the defining feature of our time, and there is no overcoming 
something so epochal.148 But the quest comes with costs. Criminal law was 
traditionally a “democratic morality play” that “taught lessons, expressed 
145 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980) (reconciling judicial review with the democratic character of American government by holding 
that courts in their constitutional role should not enforce contested value judgments but instead protect 
the conditions of representative and participatory democracy itself, crucially though not exclusively 
through the Equal Protection Clause). 
146 Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar 
Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1625 
(2017). 
147 Simonson, supra note 140. 
148 Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic Criminal Justice, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2017). 
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outrage, healed social and psychic wounds, and empowered victims, 
defendants, jurors, and the public.”149 The “fundamental problem” with 
abandoning the morality play in favor of a “bureaucratic plea bargaining 
machine” is that the machine “has lost sight of why and how We the People 
should punish” at all.150 So the question is how to mitigate the criminal 
machine’s costs without quixotically wishing away the modern order. 
Bibas proposes midlevel institutional interventions that would add 
democratic features to otherwise bureaucratic processes, as by empowering 
lay citizens to oversee the plea bargaining process to some extent, to work 
cooperatively with police, and to play a part in sentencing. In the same 
vein, Josh Bowers argues that juries at their best can be an indispensable 
source of moral and prudential deliberation in the criminal system: lay 
bodies are well-suited to the kind of “moral particularism” and “equitable 
discretion” necessary to make good judgments about “when and whether it 
is equitably appropriate to arrest, charge, brand, and punish.”151 But juries 
are not well-suited to applying formal legal tests, and it is that sort of 
technical analysis—not the judgments of “normative guilt” that were once 
the hallmark of the criminal trial but technical findings of “legal guilt”—
that juries are asked to do in contemporary trials, at least on the rare 
occasions that they are asked to do anything at all.152 Bowers thus suggests 
redirecting jury practice from the criminal trial to other adjudicatory sites, 
introducing “normative juries” to, for example, decisions about charging, 
plea bargaining, and sentencing.153 
Notice how these six ideas complement and enhance one another in 
combination. The Founders’ constitutional vision of criminal justice proves 
to be closely aligned with the philosophers’ communitarian view. That 
same constitutional–communitarian view proves to be the most powerful 
tool available to control the crime rate. This same constitutional–
communitarian–empirical view offers radically new ideas for racial justice. 
And the tools by which to advance this constitutional–communitarian–
empirical–racially-conscious view do not require an unrealistic reversion to 
a premodern era but significant yet practicable changes in existing 
institutions. Democratization as a school of thought and political program 
combines these perspectives. They are aligned—sometimes unexpectedly 
so—and they are stronger in combination. 
149 Id. at 1678. 
150 Id.  
151 Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1657, 1659 (2017). 
152 Id. at 1658–59. 
153 Id. at 1659. 
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CONCLUSION 
I began by cataloguing the crisis. I’d like to close on a note of hope. 
The history of America’s criminal system is a history of upheavals: periods 
of normal science are periodically overthrown by paradigm-shifting 
revolutions, often through sudden and far-reaching democratic political 
interventions. The country seems to be at the cusp of such a moment. We 
are in the midst of a potentially significant period of criminal justice 
reform. The former President addressed the need for reform in multiple 
contexts; many of the recent presidential candidates of both parties 
affirmed the need for criminal justice reform while on the campaign trail; 
members of both parties in Congress have recently floated bills proposing 
major changes in federal criminal law; the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
more vigilant in overseeing prosecutions than at any other time in recent 
memory, as have other federal judges; and many governors and other state 
officials are joining in the overall reformist ferment.154 Something is afoot. 
As the crisis is not just one of political will but also of ideas, scholars have 
something distinctive to contribute to this reformist ferment. The present 
moment may be one of those rare occasions in which ideas can spill out 
from the community of scholars into the broader polity and carve out far-
reaching changes in how the country operates. If that is so, there is no 
better time than this one to make our democratization side of the conflict of 
visions heard. 
154 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
